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Abstract 
The article offers a representation of the psychological mechanism for the development of a child as distinguished from those 
which are accepted in modern developmental and educational psychology. The contradiction between emerging systems of 
relations at different ages and the developing capabilities therein of a child’s activity are examined as sources of development. 
These capabilities cease to correspond to the developed system of relations, which makes it motivationally necessary to change 
the system. Development as an objective process for resolving emerging contradictions takes place in a variety of historically and 
culturally specific forms of meaningful activity in which these contradictions mature. The specificity of forms for carrying out 
activity, which is clearly traced in cross-cultural research, is an important condition for development, which enables a variety of 
possible trajectories. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the major tasks in developmental and educational psychology over a lengthy period of time was, and in 
the author’s opinion continues to be, the identification of a psychological mechanism for the ontogenetic 
development of a person. 
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Unfortunately, the search for a psychological mechanism for development too often takes place in the organism, 
but not in joint activity in which the child is involved. We shall start with the assumption that differences between 
separate trajectories of development are enabled primarily by the diversity of forms of human activity in which the 
general psychological mechanism for development takes shape. This paper provides a justification for such a 
position. Moreover, this justification is based on the results of cross-cultural research demonstrating this diversity. 
In the context of developmental psychology, the issue of identifying a psychological mechanism for development 
is connected to the search for a basis on which a unified system of development periodization may be constructed. 
2. Literature review 
In the history of psychology there have been many attempts to identify such criteria for periodization, which 
could be considered absolute, i.e. they would “work” without regard to peculiarities of social life or culture. 
Examples of such are the theories of Piaget, Freud, Erikson, et al. 
Indeed, beliefs that criteria for the periodization of development can and should be universal formed the basis of 
various systems of development periodization, whose aim was emancipation from cultural influence. Such systems 
had to equally well explain the peculiarities of the formation of a West European child as for those from other 
cultures. 
Here may be mentioned an attempt by P. P. Blonsky at the beginning of the last century who constructed his 
concept on the basis of criteria for dentition (teething) (Vygotsky, 1984). It is obvious that such periodization does 
not have a particularly high explanatory capability or practical utility, and hardly reveals anything of substance as to 
a person’s development. 
As research has shown, in the life of many traditional communities, periodizations of development, either actual 
or implicit, are also displayed, although it can hardly be said that they have any scientific basis. For example, among 
the island peoples of Oceania “popular criteria” are eating habits and types of clothes worn by members of tribes. In 
the Elema tribe of Orokolo there exist the following age categories for boys: akore hekai, who are naked; akore ikua, 
who wear a belt with a small tassel in front; erekai akore, who wear a belt with a larger tassel in front; miro akore, 
who live in isolation, preparing for their initiation ceremony, etc. (Williams, 1939). Clearly each periodization exists 
within a specific culture and the chosen criterion involves features of such specificity. Furthermore, in the cases 
considered, the criterion acts as a sole (and exclusive) attribute. 
In this regard the position of L. S. Vygotsky is of relevance. Critiquing attempts to construct a development 
periodization based on a unified criterion, Vygotsky justifiably noted that “an attribute, illustrative and substantial 
for making judgments about the development of a child in one era, loses its meaning in the next era, since during 
development those aspects which were primary are now reduced to being secondary. Thus, a criterion of sexual 
maturity is substantial and illustrative for the age of puberty, but it does not yet have such meaning for preceding 
ages. Teething at the border of infancy and early childhood may be accepted as an indicative attribute for the general 
development of a child, but the replacement of milk teeth at the age of around seven or the emergence of wisdom 
teeth cannot be equated in meaning for general development to the emergence of teeth. Such schemes do not take 
into account the reorganization of the process of development itself” (Vygotsky, 1984: 245-246). 
In modern times, these particularly important ideas of Vygotsky for developmental psychology are complemented 
by demonstration of the need to take into account sociocultural specifics of the way of life and developmental 
conditions of the child. 
Thus, it is widely reported in the literature on cross-cultural research, undertaken within the bounds of 
psychology, cultural and social anthropology, and ethnography (Cole, 1997; Kon, 2003; Luria, 1974; Mead, 1988, et 
al.), that manifestations of an objective process of development will considerably vary according to the particular 
conditions in which a person finds himself. This is characteristic for all psychological growth that occurs in 
ontogeny, from the very earliest purposeful locomotion such as sitting, crawling, standing up, etc., to complex 
intellectual operations. 
Particularly illustrative of this is the so-called demonstration of the ‘Piaget phenomenon’ in children of different 
cultures, described by Cole and Cole: “…four-year-old Bush children growing up in the Kalahari desert will hardly 
understand how to use a bath or pour water into differently-shaped containers, whereas city children will probably 
not know how to find roots in the desert that contain water” (cited in Butterworth and Harris, 2000: 228). 
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In Russian psychology, the most serious attempt to discover universal laws of development was made through the 
ideas of D. B. Elkonin (1989). These ideas maintain that the development of a child is expressed in the periodic 
change in the orientation of his activity: a primary orientation to an operational-technical sphere of activity is 
replaced by orientation to a motivational-needs-satisfaction sphere, which is followed by the orientation to an 
operational-technical sphere, etc. As a result, each time there appears a new form of leading activity corresponding 
to the character and orientation of the child and showing his passage to a new stage of development. This in turn 
leads to a change in the social situation of development and the appearance of particular growth, new requirements 
and capabilities of the subject, which again lead to a change in the leading type of activity. 
Nevertheless, the very mechanism of change in such an orientation remains unclear. The author notes that D.B. 
Elkonin himself recorded in his diary: “My periodization, although on the whole it captures the dynamics of 
development, does not reveal the internal mechanism of the dynamics” (Elkonin, 1989: 519). 
In the author’s opinion, in Elkonin’s concept there is the identification on the one hand of changes in the 
motivational sphere of a child with a change in his relation to others, and on the other hand changes in the 
operational-object sphere with a change in his relation to the object of activity. In other words, the main mechanism 
of development as an objective process of a logical change in developmental periods ought to be sought not in 
contradictions between motivational-meaning and operational-technical spheres of activity (Elkonin, 1989). 
Ultimately, the operational-technical sphere of activity, connected with learning its means, also presupposes its own 
motives, and it is likewise obvious that a system of relations requires its own means of activity, for example, 
communicative. A principal meaning acquires another contradiction, specifically, in each developmental period an 
emerging contradiction between the established system of relations of a child and, within the framework of these 
relations, the developing means of his activity to which the child during this period is motivationally perceptive, i.e. 
sensitive, but which as a result of his development ceases to correspond to the system of relations formed earlier and 
makes a change in this system motivationally necessary. In such a case, the center of attention of the developing 
subject is the whole system of relations, the rebuilding of which again logically makes motivationally important the 
development of the means of activity. 
3. Cross-cultural approaches 
Let us examine in greater detail the relationship between the system of relations and its corresponding means of 
activity. According to Elkonin’s concept, during the first year of life the leading activity of a child is its direct 
emotional communication with an adult, primarily with the mother. M. I. Lisina, in researching primarily the 
development of infants, believes that it is the mother who is the key figure in the development of the infant and the 
specifics of her activity with the child give a “tone” at this stage to its entire further development. Research has 
shown that children raised in orphanages and deprived of direct contact with their mothers were significantly behind 
in their physical and psychological development (Lisina, 2009). However, in the author’s opinion, this concept 
somewhat exaggerates the role of the biological mother in particular. In the socio-historical context this is confirmed 
by the practice of using wet nurses in aristocratic families, where after birth children were given to women specially 
hired for breastfeeding. 
Elkonin, along with Lisina, supposed that a child acquires a need for communication with a close person only by 
the age of four months and “before this, he had only organic needs” (Elkonin, 1989: 47). However, as noted by 
Leontiev (1998), this communication is mediated by a complex of concrete actions when looking after the child, 
including feeding, dressing, bathing, tactile contact, etc. In the author’s opinion, it is incorrect to regard requirements 
as only the organic needs of the child even at the age of up to four months. Naturally, a child who has only just been 
born is still unaware of the whole variety of forms of feeding; the most important thing for him is that he is fed. 
Nevertheless, there is a range of factors which influence his “psychology” from his very birth. Being born, an infant 
as a homo sapiens has a minimal set of specific reactions and thus he can learn to feed only with the help of an adult. 
The character of his development is determined by the very organization of his life conditions and the precise 
activity done jointly with an adult. This includes such characteristics as the feeding regimen (whether he is fed at 
specific times and a particular number of times, or whenever he cries), whether he is fed by one woman who is his 
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mother or by many, which is characteristic for example for aboriginal tribes of Australia and Oceania, whether he is 
swaddled or not, etc. 
All this joint activity with an adult which satisfies “organic needs” is social and historical from the very birth – it 
is first and foremost a system of relations bringing to life corresponding means of activity, which logically transform 
needs into requirements, creating thereby a motivational base for the active co-participation of the child in joint 
activity. 
Thus, for example, “in the Manus tribe the mother starts breastfeeding her child only three-four days after its 
birth. Prior to this he is breastfed by other women…” (Butinov, 1992: 70). “In the Vogeo tribe, before a child begins 
to walk, it may be breastfed only by its mother. As soon as it begins to walk, it may be fed by a nion (aunt)” (Ibid: 
75). “As soon as a child wakes up, it is picked up and, if necessary, washed and breastfed. A child’s cry is rare and 
unbearable for a Yavants” (Ogloblin, 1988: 20). The Bataks of North Sumatra “breastfeed their children for a long 
time – until the birth of the next child, sometimes up to the age of four years. Since Karo-Bataks start smoking at an 
early age, at the beginning of the century it was still possible to see a four-year-old child breastfeeding and holding 
in his hands a rolled cigarette” (Revunenkova, 1988: 51). Ket infants breastfeed until the age of six years and at the 
same time start smoking a children’s pipe (Butinov, 1992: 12). 
For the majority of tribes living in a traditional way, characteristic of a primitive communal system, there tends to 
be an absence of strict rules and restrictions, satisfaction of children’s requirements at their first request, and also 
“careful treatment, without any form of violence” (Artemova, 1992: 51). Often this leads to “infants quickly 
understanding how to get what they want and turning into little tyrants” (Soboleva, 1992: 135). It is possible that it is 
due to such a tradition overall that members of traditional communities do not, for example, have crises at three and 
seven years of age which are characteristic for our children. An obvious reason for the absence of these crises is that 
the established system of relations does not contradict those means of activity which it brought to life. 
Later on, the crisis of adolescent years connected with initiation ceremonies and moving toward adulthood passes 
quite peacefully. The latter may be explained by the fact that traditional communities do not have a contradictory 
system of rules and restrictions regarding the initiation of adolescents into the sphere of intimate relations between 
man and woman that are characteristic of western European societies. According to research by Mead, for Samoans, 
being accustomed to such relations from very early childhood, “… neither sex nor childbirth are considered 
something about which children ought not to know. A Samoan child is not made to conceal his knowledge out of 
fear of being punished and does not have to agonize over things which he does not understand well. Mystery, 
ignorance, knowledge mixed with a feeling of guilt, painful fantasies leading to malformed perceptions with possible 
consequences in the very far-off future (…) knowledge of the fact of childbirth without understanding of the 
accompanying ordeals, knowledge of the fact of death without knowledge of its accompanying decomposition – 
these are the main flaws of our fatal philosophy of protecting children from acquaintance with unpleasant truths” 
(Mead, 1988: 160). 
As for the formation of such infant movement skills as lying down, sitting, crawling and their sequence, they are 
determined by those means of joint activity with the mother in which the infant finds itself involved. 
The people of the Manus tribe, for whom a special feature is living on lagoons with houses built on the water and 
movement between them by boat, children learn to swim at the same time as they learn to walk. “Gradually the 
Manus children begin to form an ‘understanding of home’, i.e. the ability to crawl and walk around the home 
without falling into the water (the floor consists of separate timbers); the ability to climb up to the home by ladder or 
pole; the ability to throw out waste from the hut into the water; the ability to urinate between the timbers; the ability 
to not bring dirt or waste into the hut. (…) Very early an understanding begins to form of ‘boat and sea’ – a Manus 
child, while still unweaned, is already able to swim. He learns to walk and swim at the same time” (Butinov, 1992: 
70). The Yavants people “do not bring their children down to ground level until the age of seven months. There is no 
crawling period. (…) This nurtures in the Yavants people an unusual feeling of balance and space orientation” 
(Ogloblin, 1988: 21). Thais “teach children who are still unable to walk to swim. Children learn to walk themselves” 
(Ivanova, 1988: 69). 
These examples provide clear evidence that the source of development as an objective process ought to be 
considered to be the contradictions arising during the learning of concrete forms of activity as determined by the 
substance of that activity. Activity organized in a special way leads to changes in its very character and changes in 
its meaning. New requirements appear which contradict not only existing capabilities, but also previous 
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requirements. A conflict appears where there is a contradiction in requirements, the result of which is transformation 
of both the motivational-requirement and the operational-technical spheres. Therefore, development as an objective 
process of allowing emerging internal contradictions is carried out in various, historically specific forms of 
meaningful activity in which these contradictions ripen (Nechayev, 2014). 
If we take the stance that requirements as a psychological basis are in essence a product of the particular 
development of joint activity, then a division of them into “organic” and “social” (Elkonin, 1989) or indeed a 
division of mental functions into “natural” and “higher” (Vygotsky, 1983) is methodologically unsound. It is obvious 
that the organism’s need for, say, proteins, fats and carbohydrates is “organic”, but those forms of its satisfaction in 
which it is achieved in the very first minutes of life after birth leads to this need already becoming a “meaningful” 
requirement. As Marx noted, “Hunger is hunger, however hunger which is quenched by cooked meat eaten with a 
knife and fork is not the same hunger as that which wolfs down raw meat with the help of hands, nails and teeth” 
(Marx & Engels, 1968: 28). 
However, the process of objectifying organic needs and their development as “meaningful” requirements is 
directly related to the “domain” of psychology. “Strictly speaking, a person needs not bread itself, but the nutritional 
substances found in it: proteins, carbohydrates, fats, etc. It is they that give a person the substances and energy which 
his organism requires. These same substances may be found in other products too. We know how greatly national 
cuisines differ from each other. There are peoples who do not eat bread at all or rye bread or wheat bread” (Kantor, 
1967: 233). An objective organic need, therefore, cannot exist alone; it always presents itself in one or other 
“objectified” form and “becomes a requirement in bread (baked too in a particular way and also in a particular form), 
in meat (and in either the form of shish kebab or steak) ad infinitum, and so is a result of specific historical and 
social life conditions of a person, which change and will change” (Ibid). 
Thus, in the light of the specific socio-historical character of requirements, it becomes obvious that types of 
loincloth as a basis of developmental periodization can hardly be applied in western European society, yet also that 
the concept, for example, of Elkonin is equally inapplicable for Aboriginal Australians. 
This approach enables a fresh look to be taken at the main problem of educational psychology: the link between 
development and teaching, a definitive resolution of which would determine both the general strategy of teaching 
and its substance, and its specific forms and methods applicable to different stages of development, and also to 
various spheres of activity. Up to the present day many psychologists consider teaching as a process of meaningful 
activity, carried out only in school or as part of educational activity and aimed at the formation of socially necessary 
capabilities. In all conversations on “all-round and harmonic development” this leads to development being 
considered as a process of formation and the emergence of expedient growth and capabilities, followed by a person’s 
requirements. 
It is notable that this, in essence technocratic, rendering of the process of teaching was characteristic even of such 
fathers of Russian psychology as Galperin (1985), Leontiev (1998), Davydov (1996) and Elkonin (1989). Yet 
Vygotsky too noted that “children begin to learn arithmetic in school, but long beforehand they have had some 
experience with quantity – they have had to deal with operations of division, addition, subtraction, and determination 
of size. Consequently, children have their own pre-school arithmetic, which only myopic psychologists could 
ignore” (Vygotsky, 1996: 328). 
The learning activity of a child in school is merely one of many historically specific forms of joint activity during 
which conditions are created which would “direct” development in one way or another. Even some supporters of 
“developmental” education understand that such an approach to the targets and aims of education is fraught with 
certain psychologically negative consequences for the process of development. Although such authors usually 
maintain a “teacher-oriented” view of development traditional for Russian developmental psychology, they cannot 
avoid speaking about these negative results. “Teaching inevitably causes asymmetry in development. In order not to 
put either the learner or the teacher in a situation of non-productive and irresolvable contradiction, it should be 
forbidden to attempt to make the child go left and right simultaneously, offering him mutually-exclusive types of 
help and not orienting to the initiative actions of the child itself” (Tsukerman, 2006: 69). 
In this sense, the aim of educational psychology should not be research on how to organize the educational 
process in order to achieve determined targets and results, but rather to reveal in which of the possible zones of 
proximal development in a specific child emerge those motivational-requirement features that become a basis for the 
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successful realization of targets of this or that educational program. It is important to take account of the fact that not 
every interaction between adult and child, even if it is “correctly” organized from the pedagogical and 
methodological points of view, will be developmental in the true meaning of the word. 
Without understanding the internal logic of development as an objective process always taking place in a 
determined specific social situation, it is rather difficult to predict who in real life will have the greater influence on a 
child’s development: the primary school teacher forming in the young schoolchild theoretical generalization, or the 
peer group engaged in criminal activity. However, in both cases joint activity creates only the conditions for 
development, not development itself. From this point of view the issues of education and development appear 
principally different. A task of primary importance is to reveal the main “nerve” of development; the resolution of a 
determined system of contradictions which mature in activity that actually “pushes” forward development, leading to 
a developing person finding himself at a new stage which meets new criteria. By what means is this carried out? 
As stated above, a child from the very beginning of its life finds itself in a system of specific relations which it 
discovers in a ready mode: surroundings and people who engage with it. Their task is to raise the child and form 
certain capabilities. From this perspective, their activity as regards the child is a process of nurturing and teaching. 
Nurturing reveals the significance of certain aspects of its activity and teaching is aimed at forming certain means of 
activity which are appropriate to the relations the child forms with the people in its environment. However, the 
success of the adults in realizing their tasks will be determined by the extent to which these tasks are appropriate to 
developing the motivational basis for activity of the child itself, and the psychological capabilities based on them 
enable the acquisition of the means of activity offered by adults. Therefore, the developmental activity of the child 
can be presented as its joint activity with adults in a defined system of relations in which it makes use of its 
capabilities, its “productive powers”. 
From this point of view, it is obvious that Elkonin is right in noting that “…from a certain moment in the 
development of the child, it is always ‘two people’ – he and the Adult. Yet could it be that precisely the internal 
interaction of these ‘two people’ living in one child might reveal to us the process of development as a self-
propelling process?” (Elkonin, 1989: 141), since an adult considers himself in the child in the sense of developing its 
capabilities and, in so doing, pushing it toward changes in the system of relations that have been formed. However, 
this change by itself is determined by the nature of the capabilities present in the child. Thus, at a particular stage of 
development the system of communication in which the child voluntarily or otherwise is located pushes it toward 
acquiring new means of activity which widen its capabilities for co-participation in other forms of joint activity. 
Therefore, the sequence and progression of the process of development is determined by, on the one hand, the 
existing system of relations in which the child acquires corresponding capabilities, and, on the other hand, those 
capabilities which by their development logically tear up the system of relations already formed. The fact that a child 
can do something that it earlier could not changes de facto its system of relations with adults, and if this system of 
relations is organic, taking into account the changes in capabilities without a change by the adults, the emergence of 
a crisis characteristic for one or another period of development is obvious. 
Due to this, of importance is not the extent to which teaching involves development, but that teaching, being a 
specific organized process of joint activity, “creates” for a child certain conditions and means necessary for carrying 
out activity. Whether such teaching turns out to be developmental or not will be determined not by its practice, but 
by how well it “fits” into the child’s zone of proximal development, that system of motivational preferences which 
are exigent for it at that stage of development. When a child completes a task it may be due to a simple reproduction 
of means of activity that do not involve psychologically significant changes in development. In this sense such 
teaching, in spite of its productive appearance, will not lead to development. Not for nothing did Vygotsky name the 
effects of such a process “simulation”: “…each mental operation can be simulated, i.e. replaced by other operations 
which lead to the same results, but by an entirely different path” (Vygotsky, 1983: 128). Such training can be 
“developmental” only if it is appropriate to the motivational-requirement sphere and, correspondingly, the task of 
forming necessary means of activity – the task which is exigent at a given stage of the development of a personality. 
The development of means of activity seems possible only with the corresponding “readiness” of the motivational-
requirement sphere, which in turn is the result of changes in the whole system of a child’s relations. If this does not 
exist, we see a process which appears to be development, but which is very different. 
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4. Conclusion 
Therefore, we can speak about a “circular” or “spiral” structure of the process of development, which in reality is 
“immersed” in the system of objective relations and “realizes” these relations. In this “spirality” of the process with 
its contradictions of rising and descending “trends” is the “mechanism” for the emergence of psychological growth. 
It is they that act as progress for some and, correspondingly, as “development”, yet for others as regress and, 
correspondingly, “deviation”, “impediment” and “degradation” of activity. Development is an objective process and 
by acting meaningfully we must understand that every achieved “plus” has its logical “minus”. 
Differences during and in the results of development will obviously be determined by the sociocultural features of 
that system of objective relations in which the subject is involved and those means of activity which form the 
specifics of the given system of social reproduction. 
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